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i 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
I 
The proceedings from which Plaintiff/Appellant 
appeals was a hearing on the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond 
Uno presiding, which Motion for Summary Judgment was 
granted. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Utah "Limitation of Landowner 
Liability" statute, Utah Code Ann. §57-14-1 et. seq. (1979) 
should be applied to bar Plaintiff's claim against 
Defendant. 
(A) Whether Butterfield Canyon road is properly 
covered by the statute. 
(B) Whether the Plaintiff's activity at the time 
of his injury was properly considered to be 
a "recreational activity" within the purview 
of the statute. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-14-1 LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE 
The purpose of this act is to encourage public and 
private owners of land to make land and water areas available 
to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their 
liability toward persons entering thereon for those purposes. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant brought an action against Salt 
Lake County for negligent maintenance of the roadway 
commonly known as Butterfield Canyon, located in the 
Southwest corner of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The Defendant moved for a Summary Judgment and a 
hearing was held before the Honorable Raymond Uno, District 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. From a grant of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff/Appellant files this appeal. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 18, 1987, Butterfield Canyon Road was 
maintained by Salt Lake County as part of its public road 
system. (R74) The road was a narrow mountain road that 
traversed the Oquirrh Mountains from Salt Lake Valley to 
Tooele Valley. The road is used primarily as access to 
recreation areas and secondarily to get to and from Tooele 
and Salt Lake County. 
The Plaintiff and his brother at some time after 
1:30 A.M. August 18, 1987, were driving up the Butterfield 
Canyon Road enroute to the Kennecott Lookout, when the 
vehicle Plaintiff was driving struck a large rock protruding 
up from under the normally travelled portion of the road. 
The rock and excessive speed caused the vehicle to be thrown 
over the side of the canyon. The Plaintiff at the time of 
his injury was traveling on a public road enroute to the 
Kennecott Lookout for purposes of sightseeing, but never 
entered those premises. 
(Deposition Tracy Jerz p. 5 L. 11-16) 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah "Limitation of Landowner Liability Act" 
has recently been reviewed in the case of Crawford v. Tilley 
118 Utah Adv. Rep. 32. The Court's holding^ represents a 
narrow application of the Statute, in that landowners who do 
not make their property available to some members of the 
public for recreation may not invoke protection of the act. 
Protection is granted only under circumstances that would 
encourage the landowner to make land available to the public 
without compensation. 
The public road where Plaintiff suffered his 
injuries is not protected by a statute designed to promote 
outdoor recreation because the road in any event, would 
remain open for traversing the Oquirrhs from Tooele to Salt 
Lake County. Further, the Plaintiff while (driving on the 
canyon road enroute to the Kennecott Lookout and at the time 
of his injuries was not engaged in a recreational activity. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH "LIMITATION OF LANDOWNER LIABILITY" 
STATUTE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO BAR PLAINTIFF'S ACTION. 
In the District Court the Defendant's motion for 
Summary Judgment argued that the Plaintiff's action was 
barred by the Utah "Limitation of Landowner Liability" Act 
(Utah Code Ann, §57-14-1 ejt seq. (1953 as amended 
(hereinafter referred to as the "statute"). The main 
argument made by Defendant was that Plaintiff was 
sightseeing at the time of the accident and Salt Lake County 
is exempt from liability because the "road" constituted 
"land" as defined in U.C.A. 57-14-2. Section 57-14-1 U.C.A. 
requires that the recreational user enters the property for 
those purposes. In the instant case the Plaintiff was 
simply traversing the canyon road to get to the Kennecott 
Copper Lookout. 
This Court, in Crawford v. Tilley, 118 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 12 has interpreted and applied the statute narrowly 
requiring a land owner to allow use of his property to a 
part of the general public before the exemption can be 
claimed. As this Court didf nearly all Courts in states 
with statutes protecting landowners from liability for 
injuries to recreational users have interpreted and applied 
those statutes narrowly, offering guidance on the lands, 
users and activities which should be covered. (See, e.g., 
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Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 403 A.2d 9l0, (N.J. 1979) 
("Statutes such as the Landowner's Liability Act, granting 
immunity from tort liability, should be given narrow 
range."). See generally, 47 ALR 4th Effect of Statute 
Limiting Landowner's Liability for Personal Injury to 
Recreational User 262 (1986) . It is true that reading of 
certain landowner liability statutes in some jurisdictions 
is broader than in others. However, a careful reading of 
the relevant and applicable cases) (i.e., an injury on a 
public road to a person not engaged in a recreational 
activity at the time supports Appellant's position that the 
rational and commonly - accepted interpretation of the Utah 
Statute does not preclude Appellant's recovery for 
Defendant's negligent maintenance of the roadway. 
A. THE DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY IS NOfT COVERED 
BY THE STATUTE 
The Utah Statute defines "land" broadly to include 
"roads, water, water courses, private ways iand buildings". 
Utah Code Ann. §57-14-2(1) (1953 as amended). Nevertheless, 
the statute must be construed in a manner consistent with 
its avowed purpose. The purpose of the statute is 
explicitly stated in Section 57-14-1: 
... to encourage owners of land to make 
land and water areas available toi the 
public for recreational purposes by 
limiting their liability toward persons 
entering thereon for those purposes, 
(emphasis added) 
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In this case, the Plaintiff did not enter upon the 
Butterfield Canyon road for recreational purposes. The 
"use" was solely for the purpose of getting to the Kennecott 
Copper Lookout. The recreational "use" must be on the land 
of the owner claiming the exemption of the act. A public 
road, commonly used as such, does not come within the purview 
of the act. 
B. THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTIVITY WAS NOT A 
"RECREATIONAL ACTIVITY" WITHIN THE 
PURVIEW OF THE STATUTE 
The Utah Landowner Liability Statute defines 
"recreational purpose" to include viewing or enjoying 
historical, archeological, scenic or scientific sites and a 
list of other common outdoor recreational activities. Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-14-1 (3) . The Defendant in the lower court 
argued that the Plaintiff was sightseeing and consequently 
his activity came within the statute. However, the record 
discloses that Plaintiff at the time of his injuries was 
driving on the public road and had not reached his 
objective, the Kennecott Lookout. At the time Plaintiff's 
vehicle struck the large rock on the canyon road he was 
simply driving to the recreation area. 
If the injured party is not engaged in a 
recreational activity the statute should not apply not 
withstanding the fact that the property itself might be 
8 
termed "recreational". In Smith v. Southern Pacific Transp. 
Co. 467 So. 2d 70 (La. Ct. App. 1985), the Plaintiff was 
injured when the top of his van struck a railroad overpass 
in a city park. The City argued that since the park was 
recreational property and the road frequently used by 
recreational users, the Louisiana landowner liability 
statute should bar the Plaintiff's action. The Court 
disagreed, holding that "where persons are allowed to use 
the property for purposes not associated with recreational 
activities, the statutes should not apply." Id. at 73. 
It is also apparent that the statute should not 
apply unless the injured party is engaged in a recreational 
activity at the time of the injury. In Smith v. Scrap 
Disposal Corp., 158 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Cal, Ct. App. 1979), the 
Plaintiff had besn fishing with friends on property adjacent 
to the Defendants land. As they were leaving, the 
Plaintiff and his friends attempted to operate a bulldozer 
on the Defendants property, resulting in serious injury. 
The California court rejected the Defendant's contention 
that the statute should apply because fishing was the "main 
purpose" of the trip: "The underlying purpose of the trip 
could not be used to shield (Defendant) fr0m 
liability...Plaintiff...entered Scrap's property to do 
something other than to fish." Id. at 137< 
In this case, the Plaintiff and his brother were 
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traveling on Butterfield Canyon Road enroute to the 
Kennecott Copper Lookout to check the scenic views of Tooele 
and Salt Lake Counties. If the Plaintiff had arrived at the 
Kennecott property and been sightseeing at the time of his 
injuries and had not paid for those privileges then one 
could claim a factual basis upon which to assert the 
statutory exemption. Extending the statutory protection for 
the act of driving on a public road to another property for 
sightseeing is improper because it does not serve the 
purpose of the statute. This extension does nothing to 
increase public recreational access to land and water 
areas. 
If the statute applies to this case then what 
about the individual who simply uses Butterfield Canyon Road 
to travel to Tooele from Salt Lake County? Since there is 
no recreational purpose would the statute apply to bar any 
claim he may have for damages? This kind of an absurd 
result was rejected in Delta Farms Reclamation District v. 
Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 33 Cal. 3d 699f 660 P. 
2d 1168. In this case, the court rejected the statute's 
application to public entities giving two reasons for the 
limitation. First, immunity under the recreational use act 
would conflict with other California statutes expressly 
assigning liability for certain actions. (id at 1172-74). 
Second, "application of (the act) to public entities would 
10 
lead to some patently absurd results. For example, the 
Court reasoned that because the act included "structures", 
it could be applied to city streets. "Therefore, an improved 
but dangerously rutted street would expose a city to 
liability to a bicyclist who commutes to work, even though 
it was under "no duty" to keep the same street safe for the 
recreational rider right behind him". I_D at 1173. 
California Courts do not apply the statute to public 
entities, but the absurd result cited in the Delta Farm's 
case applies in the instant case if Salt Lake County is 
granted immunity. 
Even when the Plaintiff has performed one of the 
activities listed in the statute, the courts have looked 
beyond the list to the purpose and intent of the Plaintiff's 
actions. In Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, 95 
Cal. App 3d 1022, 157 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1979) the Plaintiff 
was injured when she fell from a bridge while walking her 
bicycle across the Defendant's property. The California 
Appellate Court reversed the lower court's finding that 
Plaintiff was "hiking" and limited the statute to "only 
those cases which could justifiably be characterized as 
"recreational in nature." The evidence indicated the 
Plaintiff was not hiking for pleasure but was going to a 
market. II) at 616. A similar result was obtained in 
Dominque v. Presley of Southern Cal., 243 Cal. Rptr.312, 315 
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(1988) where the Court held "the mere fact that the boy was 
riding his bicycle to his friend's house (across Defendant's 
property) does not make this trip...a recreational use." 
To extend the statutory protection for the act of 
sightseeing to include a person injured while driving on a 
public road enroute to a recreation area is inappropriate 
for two reasons. First, the person is not at that time on 
recreational property. Secondly, extending immunity to Salt 
Lake County under those facts does nothing to contribute to 
increased public recreational access to land and water 
areas. The statute's application should be limited to those 
instances where the injured party is on recreational 
property and engaged in a recreational activity at the time 
of the injury, not merely planning for such activity or 
traveling to or from the recreational place. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasons 
this Court should find no immunity under the "Limitation of 
Landowner Liability Statute," reverse the lower court 
decision and remand the case back for trial on the merits. 
DATED this _£^day of /H**<JL ,1990. 
MATT BILJANI^' 
Attorney for Appellant 
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